Assessment of the UN System of the UN System of Collective Security

                                                                 February 8, 2010

         The activism of the Security Council (SC) of the United Nations (UN) pursuant to the restoration of Kuwait’s territorial integrity after Iraq’s invasion as of August, 1990 (Iraq 1),  remains the watermark of joint enforcement action after the end of the Cold War. However, the unilateralism of the United States (US) pursuant to the 2002-2003 invasion (Iraq 2), and the consequences of the 2002-2003 action inflicted severe harm to the UN peace keeping system.

The straightforward resolution with which the SC originally rejected the invasion of Iraq 1 in 1990 proved to be an effective tool to enforce Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. However, US unilateralism that followed in 2003 became one the watermark cases of violation to the provisions of the UN Charter.

Prior to Iraq 2 the interpretation of resolution 678 (1990) became a matter of disagreement. Its authorization to states cooperating with Kuwait’s government to use force against Iraq, unless such country implemented the mandates of resolution 660 before January 15, 1991, was highly controversial. Originally, several members of the SC did not agree on the terms of such resolution. However, the US promoted what would be the basis of what later came to be known as the coalition of the willing, as an alternative to the SC’s hesitance to engage in further military action against Iraq.

Further, the issuance of resolution 778 in 1992, in Iraq 1, which had “authorized states to seize revenues from Iraqi petroleum sales and transfer them to the escrow account provided for in resolution 706 (1991)”, which the SC enforced for a long time, seemed a broad expansion of the rights of the SC under the UN Charter. But it became even more apparent the lack of compatibility with the Charter when the coalition of the willing took action over Iraqi soil in 2002-2003, violating Iraq’s sovereignty, in detriment of the UN Charter.

In addition, Iraq 2 action took place after the oil-for-food corruption scandal had erupted, triggering a strong international and domestic opposition against the US, the SC, and the UN, due to the corruption of UN’ and US’ officials and contractors. The scandal further supported the theory of the illegitimacy of the sanctions imposed over a sovereign state, let alone the lack of existence of a real and imminent threat, as the final report of UN officials with regard to the lack of existence of weapons of mass destruction proved.

            In conclusion, after Iraq 2 the strength of the UN system was undermined by (i) the broad interpretation that the coalition of the willing gave to the scope and mandate to undertake “all necessary measures” to enforce resolution 660 pursuant to a collective reaction to Iraq 1, (ii) the violation of the right of engaging in military action only in cases of extreme and imminent necessity, and, (iii) a de facto violation to the sovereignty right of a member state. Therefore the UN system was severely hurt, and has been seen since then as an agent without sufficient power to deter conflict, self interest of states, and safeguard peace.