Flaws of the Responsibility to Protect Formula

March 8, 2010

The Responsibility to Protect formula included in the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005 has in my view five major problems.

First, by mentioning the responsibility of each individual state to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, it provides a numerus clausus list that bars responsibility to protect in cases such as environmental catastrophes or disastrous events of other nature that we have not even imagined.

Second, the document does not create a sound rationale for right to protect intervention, but instead states an overbroad case-by-case principle of intervention that does not enhance predictability of international relations, nor of limits to the sovereignty principle, and that even less helps to establish a useful criteria to determine in which cases intervention is necessary or even more, mandatory.

Third, by stating that each individual State “has the responsibility to protect its populations from…” the document allows different interpretations, of which the most notable in my view are: a) Each individual state does not have an obligation to protect the populations of other countries in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. And b) As the term population is not defined, it could be argued that a state could unilaterally undertake measures to protect its citizens or residents located abroad, in the country where the genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity are actually taking place. These possible interpretations weaken the entire responsibility to protect principles. 

Fourth, the authority to employ the last resort and intervene militarily still rests solely in the Security Council and the General Assembly. Given the veto power, responsibility to protect norms, seem to be ineffective tools pursuant to the prevention of humanitarian catastrophes, due to political or national security interests of the Permanent Members of the Council. A more flexible approach, not needing consensus of the P5 would be desirable.

Fifth, the right to use force under Chapter VII is not accompanied by a rationale of the scope of the intervention with regard to local political processes, construction of democracy, checks and balances, and in general, the strength of nation states capable of providing human security to their populations. Therefore, the right to sovereignty is affected, and citizens of the intervened states may become subject to neocolonialism and international opportunism.

In conclusion, an open list of responsibility to protect cases would be preferable, clearer boundaries and rationales for intervention should be designed, a better formulation of the duties of each individual state with regard to the populations of other countries should be made, the term populations should be clarified, the veto power should be eroded in cases of urgent need of responsibility to protect cases, and boundaries should be defined with regard to intervention in failed or abusive states, that need to be removed in order to protect the security of its nationals.